---
title: "Smartsheet Optimizely website-script compromise"
description: "Smartsheet’s November 2026 website-script compromise: affected hosts, observed cleanup, supplier access flaw and the limits of confirmed visitor impact."
incident_type: "Cybersecurity incident"
status: "active"
last_modified: "2026-11-17"
canonical_url: "https://www.ally.security/incidents/smartsheet-optimizely-script-compromise-2026"
markdown_url: "https://www.ally.security/incidents/smartsheet-optimizely-script-compromise-2026.md"
stix_url: "https://www.ally.security/incidents/smartsheet-optimizely-script-compromise-2026/stix.json"
---

# Smartsheet Optimizely website-script compromise

Malicious Optimizely project code was associated with Smartsheet’s listed web properties on November 16, 2026. The evidence separates website exposure, cleanup observations and confirmed consequences.

Last modified Nov 17, 2026 · 5 sources

## Summary

- **Environment:** Website JavaScript on de.smartsheet.com, es.smartsheet.com, fr.smartsheet.com, help.smartsheet.com
- **Operational impact:** Observed website-script exposure; service downtime is not established
- **Financial impact:** Visitor-level losses for this organization remain unquantified

## What happened

On November 16, 2026, malicious code in [Optimizely](https://www.optimizely.com/) website-experimentation scripts was associated with [Smartsheet](https://de.smartsheet.com/). [Report URI’s investigation](https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/) lists `de.smartsheet.com`, `es.smartsheet.com`, `fr.smartsheet.com`, `help.smartsheet.com` in its technology and SaaS inventory. [4](#source-4)

Report URI prints German, Spanish, French and help-site hosts and abbreviates two more. The printed inventory is incomplete and does not establish access to customer sheets or workspace contents. [4](#source-4)

[StepSecurity’s investigation](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/optimjack-optimizely-hosted-scripts-crypto-clipper-card-skimmer) placed Smartsheet in the subset of public website captures for which the final financial-theft payload was stored with an HTTP 200 response. Those captures were recorded between 17:57 and 21:23 UTC on November 16; the published range is for the subset, rather than a precise exposure window for Smartsheet. [1](#source-1)

[Amirul Cyber’s page table](https://amirulcyber.com/2026/11/16/optimjack-optimizely-skimmer/) identifies `www.smartsheet.com/` loading Optimizely project `752092193.js`. This adds a specific observed page and project to the localized and help-site hosts printed in the broader inventory. [5](#source-5)

The supplier later identified a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow. Attackers used that path to add JavaScript to customer projects. Report URI found 188 poisoned snippets across 178 named entries in its sample of 1,611; those are script and inventory counts, rather than a count of affected visitors. [2](#source-2) [4](#source-4)

## Impact

- The shared wallet-substitution module could change validated cryptocurrency destinations in accessible page content, clipboard activity and browser requests. Whether a visitor lost funds depended on what the page displayed and what the visitor subsequently did. [1](#source-1)
- The card module sought a valid card number, expiry and security code in accessible forms and outgoing requests. Payment fields isolated inside a cross-origin provider frame were outside that module’s reach. The reviewed material does not identify the payment-field design of every affected Smartsheet page. [1](#source-1)
- Cookie and screenshot collection was conditional on an address swap. It could include a page image, original addresses, the page URL and JavaScript-readable cookies; `HttpOnly` cookies were outside `document.cookie` access. [1](#source-1)
- Apple mobile user agents could trigger additional exploit-kit loading. A recorded script or HTTP response does not prove a successful device infection. Counts of stolen cards, affected sessions, compromised devices and losses attributable to Smartsheet remain unquantified. [1](#source-1) [4](#source-4)

## Timeline

### November 16, 2026 — Smartsheet snippet observed clean

Report URI’s timeline records the Smartsheet snippet being cleaned at about 20:56 UTC on November 16. This is the researcher’s script observation, rather than a company-confirmed time for ending every browser session. [Research timeline](https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/). [4](#source-4)

### November 16, 2026 — Researcher records clean snippet

Report URI’s affected-host table marked the observed Smartsheet snippet entry clean at its 21:52 UTC checkpoint on November 16. [Research timeline](https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/). [4](#source-4)

### November 16, 2026 — Observed Optimizely set is clean

Report URI’s November 17 follow-up says every poisoned file in its observed Optimizely set had been clean since 23:11 UTC on November 16. This does not give an individual cached-page clearance time. [Research timeline](https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/). [4](#source-4)

### November 17, 2026 — Optimizely confirms remediation

The provider’s incident notice confirms that it fixed the vulnerability, removed injected code, secured affected accounts and added protections against unauthorized delivery. [Incident notice](https://status.optimizely.com/incidents/ftw0fh9wx43z). [3](#source-3)

### November 17, 2026 — Briefing updated

This briefing was last reviewed and updated on November 17, 2026.

## Threat Group & Attack Vector

Optimizely’s signup-flow flaw supplied the disclosed access path. The public statement does not explain the code-level bug or how the path permitted changes across unrelated projects. Report URI located the injection in the customer-controlled Project JavaScript field: the normal experiment code stayed present, and trusted delivery served the modified content. [2](#source-2) [4](#source-4)

Report URI observed Smartsheet’s snippet become clean and then carry an encoded loader again. It interpreted the reinfection as evidence that the attacker still had write access at that point; the report does not publish a separate account-access investigation by Smartsheet. [4](#source-4)

The campaign used several loader forms, including an explicit remote URL, a Base64-encoded URL and—in some projects—an embedded fallback copy. Those variants explain why a simple search for one external hostname could miss affected project content. The reviewed evidence does not identify the variant used on every Smartsheet page. [4](#source-4)

### Actors

- No threat actor group has been identified in the reviewed public evidence.

### TTPs

- [T1195.002 — Compromise Software Supply Chain](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/) describes modification of trusted Optimizely project code before downstream websites received it. [4](#source-4)

## Response

Report URI’s timeline records the Smartsheet snippet being cleaned at about 20:56 UTC on November 16. This is the researcher’s script observation, rather than a company-confirmed time for ending every browser session. [4](#source-4)

Report URI’s affected-host table marked the observed Smartsheet snippet entry clean at its 21:52 UTC checkpoint on November 16. The checkpoint concerns the fetched snippet; already-open pages and cached copies have no published clearance time. [4](#source-4)

Optimizely said it closed the vulnerable path, removed the injection, ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset affected account access and notified affected customers. Those measures concerned affected Optimizely accounts; downstream visitor sessions required their own exposure assessment. [2](#source-2)

[StepSecurity](https://www.stepsecurity.io/) reported the main payload domain on registry hold at 00:37 UTC on November 17. Optimizely’s 01:02 UTC notice confirmed its remediation. Those shared containment milestones do not resolve Smartsheet’s individual visitor exposure or prove that previously collected information was recovered. [1](#source-1) [3](#source-3)

The public material reviewed for this briefing did not provide an additional Smartsheet incident statement, a visitor notification count or a quantified loss assessment.

## Assets

[Download the case-scoped STIX 2.1 bundle](<https://www.ally.security/incidents/smartsheet-optimizely-script-compromise-2026/stix.json>)

## Sources

Primary source records used to research this incident.

<a id="source-1"></a>

### OPTIMJACK: Optimizely-Hosted Scripts Loaded a Crypto Clipper and Card Skimmer on 178 Organizations

research · StepSecurity

<https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/optimjack-optimizely-hosted-scripts-crypto-clipper-card-skimmer>

<a id="source-2"></a>

### Optimizely hack infected CNN, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce sites with malware

news · BleepingComputer · Nov 17, 2026

<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/optimizely-supply-chain-attack-delivers-malware-to-cnn-fox-news-bbc-salesforce-sites/>

<a id="source-3"></a>

### Web Experimentation Security Incident

official · Optimizely · Nov 17, 2026

<https://status.optimizely.com/incidents/ftw0fh9wx43z>

<a id="source-4"></a>

### World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely

research · Report URI · Nov 16, 2026

<https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/>

<a id="source-5"></a>

### CNN, Zoom, Fox News Served Visitors a Crypto-Stealing Skimmer – OPTIMJACK (Nov 2026)

research · Amirul Cyber · Nov 16, 2026

<https://amirulcyber.com/2026/11/16/optimjack-optimizely-skimmer/>

<details>
<summary>Evidence ledger</summary>

Review the supporting structured claims.

1. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: Report URI associated malicious Optimizely snippets with Smartsheet and listed these hosts: de.smartsheet.com, es.smartsheet.com, fr.smartsheet.com, help.smartsheet.com.
2. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: Report URI’s timeline records the Smartsheet snippet being cleaned at about 20:56 UTC on November 16. This is the researcher’s script observation, rather than a company-confirmed time for ending every browser session.
3. **Used Attack Technique · 95% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/
4. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: The common payload selected additional loading on Apple mobile user agents; this delivery behavior did not establish successful compromise of individual devices.
5. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet snippet observed clean: Report URI’s timeline records the Smartsheet snippet being cleaned at about 20:56 UTC on November 16. This is the researcher’s script observation, rather than a company-confirmed time for ending every browser session.
6. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: Report URI reported that all malicious files in its observed Optimizely set were clean by November 16 at 23:11 UTC.
7. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: Optimizely said it fixed the vulnerability, removed injected JavaScript, secured affected accounts, and added protections against unauthorized code delivery.
8. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: Optimizely identified the exploited vulnerability as part of its Experimentation account signup flow.
9. **Occurred At · 100% confidence · current**  
   Researcher confirms cleanup of its observed Optimizely script set: 2026-11-16T23:11:00Z
10. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: The common payload could replace cryptocurrency addresses, capture card fields, collect accessible cookies and screenshots, and deliver iOS exploit-kit loaders.
11. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: The public research left visitor-level losses, captured information, and successful device infections unresolved.
12. **Occurred At · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: 2026-11-16
13. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: Report URI’s affected-host table marked the observed Smartsheet snippet entry clean at its 21:52 UTC checkpoint on November 16.
14. **Occurred At · 100% confidence · current**  
   Researchers identify Smartsheet's affected website scripts: 2026-11-16
15. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: The screenshot and cookie collection path was conditional on an address swap, and sent the page URL, JavaScript-readable cookies, original addresses and a page image.
16. **Occurred At · 100% confidence · current**  
   Researcher records clean snippet: 2026-11-16T21:52:00Z
17. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: Report URI found 188 poisoned Optimizely snippets in a reviewed sample of 1,611, associated with 178 named organization and brand entries.
18. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: Amirul Cyber’s page table identifies `www.smartsheet.com/` loading Optimizely project `752092193.js`. This adds a specific observed page and project to the localized and help-site hosts printed in the broader inventory.
19. **Occurred At · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet snippet observed clean: 2026-11-16T20:56:00Z
20. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: The common payload validated cryptocurrency-address checksums and could replace destinations in accessible page content, clipboard operations and browser requests.
21. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: The analyzed card skimmer could not read payment fields isolated inside a cross-origin payment iframe.
22. **Occurred At · 100% confidence · current**  
   Optimizely confirms its remediation: 2026-11-17T01:02:00Z
23. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: StepSecurity placed Smartsheet in the subset of public website captures for which the final financial-theft payload was stored with an HTTP 200 response. Those captures were recorded between 17:57 and 21:23 UTC on November 16; the published range is for the subset, rather than a precise exposure window for Smartsheet.
24. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: StepSecurity reported that the main payload domain was put on registry hold at 00:37 UTC on November 17 and no longer resolved when reviewed.
25. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: The card module looked for a valid card number, expiry and security code in accessible form submissions and fetch/XHR traffic.
26. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: Report URI observed plain remote-script, Base64-encoded URL and embedded-fallback loader variants across the affected projects.
27. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: Report URI observed Smartsheet’s snippet become clean and then carry an encoded loader again. It interpreted the reinfection as evidence that the attacker still had write access at that point; the report does not publish a separate account-access investigation by Smartsheet.
28. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: Optimizely said it ended active sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected user accounts.
29. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: The attacker changed the Project JavaScript field while the rest of the affected snippet remained intact.
30. **Used Product · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: Optimizely Web Experimentation
31. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: HttpOnly cookies were outside the common payload’s document.cookie access.
32. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: Optimizely said it notified all affected customers.
33. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: The attacker modified the Project JavaScript field in customer Optimizely projects, and the altered snippets were distributed through the trusted delivery service.
34. **Affected Organization · 100% confidence · current**  
   Smartsheet website-script exposure: Smartsheet
35. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   Researcher records clean snippet: Report URI’s affected-host table marked the observed Smartsheet snippet entry clean at its 21:52 UTC checkpoint on November 16.

</details>
