Summary
- Environment: Website JavaScript on evergage.com, exacttarget.com, pardot.com, salesforce-scrt.com
- Operational impact: Observed website-script exposure; service downtime is not established
- Financial impact: Visitor-level losses for this organization remain unquantified
- Record status: Developing record. Reviewed November 17, 2026; updated as evidence emerges.
What happened
On November 16, 2026, malicious code in Optimizely website-experimentation scripts was associated with Salesforce. Report URI’s investigation lists evergage.com, exacttarget.com, pardot.com, salesforce-scrt.com in its technology and SaaS inventory. [5]
Report URI prints four Salesforce-associated hosts and abbreviates four additional hosts. The abbreviated inventory is not an exhaustive list of the affected Salesforce web properties. [5]
StepSecurity’s investigation placed Salesforce in the subset of public website captures for which the final financial-theft payload was stored with an HTTP 200 response. Those captures were recorded between 17:57 and 21:23 UTC on November 16; the published range is for the subset, rather than a precise exposure window for Salesforce. [1]
Hudson Rock’s archive table records salesforce.com loading the poisoned Optimizely resource cdn.optimizely.com/js/22444972181.js at 14:32 UTC on November 16. Kirk of Ohey verified the historical response body, and Hudson Rock corroborated the recorded hash. The capture time documents an observation, without establishing the start of the intrusion. [6]
The supplier later identified a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow. Attackers used that path to add JavaScript to customer projects. Report URI found 188 poisoned snippets across 178 named entries in its sample of 1,611; those are script and inventory counts, rather than a count of affected visitors. [3] [5]
Impact
- The shared wallet-substitution module could change validated cryptocurrency destinations in accessible page content, clipboard activity and browser requests. Whether a visitor lost funds depended on what the page displayed and what the visitor subsequently did. [1]
- The card module sought a valid card number, expiry and security code in accessible forms and outgoing requests. Payment fields isolated inside a cross-origin provider frame were outside that module’s reach. The reviewed material does not identify the payment-field design of every affected Salesforce page. [1]
- Cookie and screenshot collection was conditional on an address swap. It could include a page image, original addresses, the page URL and JavaScript-readable cookies;
HttpOnlycookies were outsidedocument.cookieaccess. [1] - Apple mobile user agents could trigger additional exploit-kit loading. A recorded script or HTTP response does not prove a successful device infection. Counts of stolen cards, affected sessions, compromised devices and losses attributable to Salesforce remain unquantified. [1] [5]
Timeline
Historical poisoned response recorded
Hudson Rock’s archive table records
[6]salesforce.comloading the poisoned Optimizely resourcecdn.optimizely.com/js/22444972181.jsat 14:32 UTC on November 16. Kirk of Ohey verified the historical response body, and Hudson Rock corroborated the recorded hash. The capture time documents an observation, without establishing the start of the intrusion. Source report.Researcher records clean snippet
Report URI’s affected-host table marked the observed Salesforce snippet entry clean at its 21:52 UTC checkpoint on November 16. Research timeline.
[5]Observed Optimizely set is clean
Report URI’s November 17 follow-up says every poisoned file in its observed Optimizely set had been clean since 23:11 UTC on November 16. This does not give an individual cached-page clearance time. Research timeline.
[5]Optimizely confirms remediation
The provider’s incident notice confirms that it fixed the vulnerability, removed injected code, secured affected accounts and added protections against unauthorized delivery. Incident notice.
[4]Salesforce publishes precautionary response
Salesforce’s advisory records its investigation and precautionary check that Optimizely scripts were disabled. The message creation timestamp is separate from its configured start-date field. Official advisory.
[2]Briefing updated
This briefing was last reviewed and updated on November 17, 2026.
Threat Group & Attack Vector
Optimizely’s signup-flow flaw supplied the disclosed access path. The public statement does not explain the code-level bug or how the path permitted changes across unrelated projects. Report URI located the injection in the customer-controlled Project JavaScript field: the normal experiment code stayed present, and trusted delivery served the modified content. [3] [5]
The campaign used several loader forms, including an explicit remote URL, a Base64-encoded URL and—in some projects—an embedded fallback copy. Those variants explain why a simple search for one external hostname could miss affected project content. The reviewed evidence does not identify the variant used on every Salesforce page. [5]
Actors
- No threat actor group has been identified in the reviewed public evidence.
TTPs
- T1195.002 — Compromise Software Supply Chain describes modification of trusted Optimizely project code before downstream websites received it. [5]
Response
In its official advisory, Salesforce said it was investigating unauthorized changes to Optimizely scripts on certain Salesforce websites and confirming that the scripts were disabled across preview and production instances as a precaution. [2]
Salesforce said it would notify affected customers without undue delay if its investigation identified unauthorized access to their data. That conditional commitment is not confirmation that customer data was accessed. [2]
Report URI’s affected-host table marked the observed Salesforce snippet entry clean at its 21:52 UTC checkpoint on November 16. The checkpoint concerns the fetched snippet; already-open pages and cached copies have no published clearance time. [5]
Optimizely said it closed the vulnerable path, removed the injection, ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset affected account access and notified affected customers. Those measures concerned affected Optimizely accounts; downstream visitor sessions required their own exposure assessment. [3]
StepSecurity reported the main payload domain on registry hold at 00:37 UTC on November 17. Optimizely’s 01:02 UTC notice confirmed its remediation. Those shared containment milestones do not resolve Salesforce’s individual visitor exposure or prove that previously collected information was recovered. [1] [4]
