Prestige Core Solution roadside-service data incident

A supplier breach exposed roadside-service records; later notices confirmed three card-number records and Mitsui’s downstream customer scope.

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Summary

  • Environment: Roadside-service reception and dispatch systems
  • Operational impact: Affected system stopped; alternative roadside operations continued
  • Financial impact: Financial impact remained under assessment
  • Record status: Developing record. Reviewed November 9, 2026; updated as evidence emerges.

What happened

Prestige International confirmed removal of customer information from systems used by its subsidiary Prestige Core Solution (PCS) for roadside services. [3]

Impact

  • Up to approximately 5.5 million records, including duplicates, were involved. Contact details, vehicle identifiers, accident/breakdown records and some bank-account information were affected; the unique-person total remained under review. [3]
  • A November 6 correction confirmed three card-number records, following an initial statement that no card-data leakage had been confirmed. [2]
  • Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance reported approximately 228,000 records for some auto-insurance customers within this supplier incident. Its affected fields excluded card and bank-account information. This downstream figure is not added to the supplier total. [1]

Timeline

  1. Unauthorized access detected

    Prestige invalidated misused credentials.

    [3]
  2. Business system stopped

    Access had continued after the initial response.

    [3]
  3. Supplier discloses data removal

    The first notice sets out the affected record scope.

    [3]
  4. Card-number exposure confirmed

    Prestige said it had contacted the card issuers.

    [2]
  5. Mitsui reports downstream impact

    The insurer’s notice identifies its affected customer records.

    [1]
  6. Briefing updated

    This briefing was last reviewed and updated on November 9, 2026.

Threat Group & Attack Vector

The response included revoking credentials used without authorization. The method used to acquire them has not been disclosed. [3]

Actors

  • No threat actor group has been identified in the reviewed public evidence.

TTPs

Response

Prestige maintained roadside services through alternative operations while specialists investigated. Regulator reporting and police consultation were underway. [3] Mitsui received PCS’s report November 4 and planned individual notifications. [1]