---
title: "PowerSchool security incident"
description: "What the retained public evidence establishes about the PowerSchool incident, its attack path, impact, and response."
incident_type: "Cybersecurity incident"
status: "active"
last_modified: "2026-09-19"
canonical_url: "https://www.ally.security/incidents/powerschool-security-incident-2024"
markdown_url: "https://www.ally.security/incidents/powerschool-security-incident-2024.md"
stix_url: "https://www.ally.security/incidents/powerschool-security-incident-2024/stix.json"
---

# PowerSchool security incident

Compromised support-portal credentials, no MFA. Data on tens of millions of US/Canadian students and teachers stolen; PowerSchool paid the extortion demand, then individual school districts were re-extorted with the same stolen data months later.

Last modified Sep 19, 2026 · 1 source

## Summary

- **Environment:** EdTech / K-12 student information systems
- **Operational impact:** Data on tens of millions of US/Canadian students and teachers stolen; PowerSchool paid the extortion demand, then individual school districts were re-extorted with the same stolen data months later
- **Financial impact:** No financial figure is established by the reviewed source evidence

## What happened

In Dec 2024 / Jan 2025, PowerSchool experienced an incident in its edtech / k-12 student information systems environment. The retained source describes the attack path as follows: Compromised support-portal credentials, no MFA. [1](#source-1)

The documented consequence was: Data on tens of millions of US/Canadian students and teachers stolen; PowerSchool paid the extortion demand, then individual school districts were re-extorted with the same stolen data months later. [1](#source-1)

## Impact

- Documented impact: Data on tens of millions of US/Canadian students and teachers stolen; PowerSchool paid the extortion demand, then individual school districts were re-extorted with the same stolen data months later. [1](#source-1)
- No financial loss, ransom amount, recovery cost, or regulatory penalty is established by the reviewed source evidence.

## Timeline

### January 8, 2025 — Documented public update

The [PowerSchool cybersecurity incident](https://www.gov.nl.ca/education/powerschool-cybersecurity-incident/) records the incident facts used in this briefing. [1](#source-1)

### September 19, 2026 — Briefing updated

This briefing was last reviewed and updated on September 19, 2026.

## Threat Group & Attack Vector

The retained source describes the attack path as follows: Compromised support-portal credentials, no MFA. The canonical record does not add intrusion steps beyond those supported by the source. [1](#source-1)

### Actors

- No threat actor group has been identified in the reviewed public evidence.

### TTPs

- No specific MITRE ATT\&CK technique is currently mapped for this case.

## Response

The retained source reports that identity or credit monitoring was offered to affected people. [1](#source-1)
The retained source describes containment action intended to limit further access or disruption. [1](#source-1)

This account is bounded to [PowerSchool cybersecurity incident](https://www.gov.nl.ca/education/powerschool-cybersecurity-incident/). Details absent from that evidence are left unresolved rather than inferred. [1](#source-1)

## Assets

[Download the case-scoped STIX 2.1 bundle](<https://www.ally.security/incidents/powerschool-security-incident-2024/stix.json>)

## Sources

Primary source records used to research this incident.

<a id="source-1"></a>

### PowerSchool cybersecurity incident

official · Government of Newfoundland and Labrador

<https://www.gov.nl.ca/education/powerschool-cybersecurity-incident/>

<details>
<summary>Evidence ledger</summary>

Review the supporting structured claims.

1. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   PowerSchool security incident: The reviewed source documents the powerschool security incident involving PowerSchool.
2. **Resulted In · 90% confidence · current**  
   PowerSchool security incident: The retained source reports that identity or credit monitoring was offered to affected people.
3. **Resulted In · 85% confidence · current**  
   PowerSchool security incident: Data on tens of millions of US/Canadian students and teachers stolen; PowerSchool paid the extortion demand, then individual school districts were re-extorted with the same stolen data months later.
4. **Resulted In · 90% confidence · current**  
   PowerSchool security incident: The retained source describes containment action intended to limit further access or disruption.
5. **Occurred At · 100% confidence · current**  
   Documented public update: 2025-01-08
6. **Affected Organization · 100% confidence · current**  
   PowerSchool security incident: PowerSchool
7. **Resulted In · 87% confidence · current**  
   PowerSchool security incident: Compromised support-portal credentials, no MFA.

</details>