Ledger Optimizely website-script compromise

Malicious Optimizely project code was associated with Ledger’s listed web properties on November 16, 2026. The evidence separates website exposure, cleanup observations and confirmed consequences.

Last modified

Summary

  • Environment: Website JavaScript on ledger.com, www.ledger.com
  • Operational impact: Observed website-script exposure; service downtime is not established
  • Financial impact: Visitor-level losses for this organization remain unquantified
  • Record status: Developing record. Reviewed November 17, 2026; updated as evidence emerges.

What happened

On November 16, 2026, malicious code in Optimizely website-experimentation scripts was associated with Ledger. Report URI’s investigation lists ledger.com, www.ledger.com in its crypto & trading inventory. [5]

The documented Ledger scope is the named website hosts. The researchers did not publish a page-by-page exposure map, a first malicious load time for each path, or a count of affected visitors for this entry. [5]

The supplier later identified a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow. Attackers used that path to add JavaScript to customer projects. Report URI found 188 poisoned snippets across 178 named entries in its sample of 1,611; those are script and inventory counts, rather than a count of affected visitors. [3] [5]

Impact

  • The shared wallet-substitution module could change validated cryptocurrency destinations in accessible page content, clipboard activity and browser requests. Whether a visitor lost funds depended on what the page displayed and what the visitor subsequently did. [1]
  • The card module sought a valid card number, expiry and security code in accessible forms and outgoing requests. Payment fields isolated inside a cross-origin provider frame were outside that module’s reach. The reviewed material does not identify the payment-field design of every affected Ledger page. [1]
  • Cookie and screenshot collection was conditional on an address swap. It could include a page image, original addresses, the page URL and JavaScript-readable cookies; HttpOnly cookies were outside document.cookie access. [1]
  • Apple mobile user agents could trigger additional exploit-kit loading. A recorded script or HTTP response does not prove a successful device infection. Counts of stolen cards, affected sessions, compromised devices and losses attributable to Ledger remain unquantified. [1] [5]

Timeline

  1. Ledger snippet observed clean

    Report URI’s timeline records the Ledger snippet being cleaned at about 20:41 UTC on November 16. This is the researcher’s script observation, rather than a company-confirmed time for ending every browser session. Research timeline.

    [5]
  2. Researcher records clean snippet

    Report URI’s affected-host table marked the observed Ledger snippet entry clean at its 21:52 UTC checkpoint on November 16. Research timeline.

    [5]
  3. Observed Optimizely set is clean

    Report URI’s November 17 follow-up says every poisoned file in its observed Optimizely set had been clean since 23:11 UTC on November 16. This does not give an individual cached-page clearance time. Research timeline.

    [5]
  4. Optimizely confirms remediation

    The provider’s incident notice confirms that it fixed the vulnerability, removed injected code, secured affected accounts and added protections against unauthorized delivery. Incident notice.

    [4]
  5. Ledger statement is reported

    U.Today published Ledger Donjon’s statement that website delivery had stopped and its device security architecture was unaffected. This is the reporting time, rather than a demonstrated start or end of every visitor’s exposure. Source report.

    [2]
  6. Briefing updated

    This briefing was last reviewed and updated on November 17, 2026.

Threat Group & Attack Vector

Optimizely’s signup-flow flaw supplied the disclosed access path. The public statement does not explain the code-level bug or how the path permitted changes across unrelated projects. Report URI located the injection in the customer-controlled Project JavaScript field: the normal experiment code stayed present, and trusted delivery served the modified content. [3] [5]

The campaign used several loader forms, including an explicit remote URL, a Base64-encoded URL and—in some projects—an embedded fallback copy. Those variants explain why a simple search for one external hostname could miss affected project content. The reviewed evidence does not identify the variant used on every Ledger page. [5]

Actors

  • No threat actor group has been identified in the reviewed public evidence.

TTPs

Response

Ledger Donjon said the website issue had been remediated and malicious code was no longer being served. In the statement reproduced by U.Today, the security team said the incident did not affect the security architecture of Ledger devices and private keys remained protected by the device. [2]

Report URI’s timeline records the Ledger snippet being cleaned at about 20:41 UTC on November 16. This is the researcher’s script observation, rather than a company-confirmed time for ending every browser session. [5]

Report URI’s affected-host table marked the observed Ledger snippet entry clean at its 21:52 UTC checkpoint on November 16. The checkpoint concerns the fetched snippet; already-open pages and cached copies have no published clearance time. [5]

Optimizely said it closed the vulnerable path, removed the injection, ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset affected account access and notified affected customers. Those measures concerned affected Optimizely accounts; downstream visitor sessions required their own exposure assessment. [3]

StepSecurity reported the main payload domain on registry hold at 00:37 UTC on November 17. Optimizely’s 01:02 UTC notice confirmed its remediation. Those shared containment milestones do not resolve Ledger’s individual visitor exposure or prove that previously collected information was recovered. [1] [4]