---
title: "LastPass security incident"
description: "What the retained public evidence establishes about the LastPass incident, its attack path, impact, and response."
incident_type: "Cybersecurity incident"
status: "active"
last_modified: "2026-09-19"
canonical_url: "https://www.ally.security/incidents/lastpass-security-incident-2022"
markdown_url: "https://www.ally.security/incidents/lastpass-security-incident-2022.md"
stix_url: "https://www.ally.security/incidents/lastpass-security-incident-2022/stix.json"
---

# LastPass security incident

Compromise of a DevOps engineer's home computer via keylogger, captured master password; two-stage intrusion (Aug dev environment, then Nov/Dec cloud storage). Encrypted password vaults for all customers stolen.

Last modified Sep 19, 2026 · 1 source

## Summary

- **Environment:** Password manager
- **Operational impact:** Encrypted password vaults for all customers stolen
- **Financial impact:** No financial figure is established by the reviewed source evidence

## What happened

In 2022, LastPass experienced an incident in its password manager environment. The retained source describes the attack path as follows: Compromise of a DevOps engineer's home computer via keylogger, captured master password; two-stage intrusion (Aug dev environment, then Nov/Dec cloud storage). [1](#source-1)

The documented consequence was: Encrypted password vaults for all customers stolen. [1](#source-1)

## Impact

- Documented impact: Encrypted password vaults for all customers stolen. [1](#source-1)
- No financial loss, ransom amount, recovery cost, or regulatory penalty is established by the reviewed source evidence.

## Threat Group & Attack Vector

The retained source describes the attack path as follows: Compromise of a DevOps engineer's home computer via keylogger, captured master password; two-stage intrusion (Aug dev environment, then Nov/Dec cloud storage). The canonical record does not add intrusion steps beyond those supported by the source. [1](#source-1)

### Actors

- No threat actor group has been identified in the reviewed public evidence.

### TTPs

- No specific MITRE ATT\&CK technique is currently mapped for this case.

## Response

The reviewed source does not describe containment, notification, or restoration steps in enough detail to summarize them responsibly.

This account is bounded to [Security incident update and recommended actions](https://blog.lastpass.com/posts/security-incident-update-recommended-actions). Details absent from that evidence are left unresolved rather than inferred. [1](#source-1)

## Assets

[Download the case-scoped STIX 2.1 bundle](<https://www.ally.security/incidents/lastpass-security-incident-2022/stix.json>)

## Sources

Primary source records used to research this incident.

<a id="source-1"></a>

### Security incident update and recommended actions

official · LastPass

<https://blog.lastpass.com/posts/security-incident-update-recommended-actions>

<details>
<summary>Evidence ledger</summary>

Review the supporting structured claims.

1. **Resulted In · 88% confidence · current**  
   LastPass security incident: Encrypted password vaults for all customers stolen.
2. **Affected Organization · 100% confidence · current**  
   LastPass security incident: LastPass
3. **Resulted In · 100% confidence · current**  
   LastPass security incident: The reviewed source documents the lastpass security incident involving LastPass.
4. **Resulted In · 85% confidence · current**  
   LastPass security incident: Compromise of a DevOps engineer's home computer via keylogger, captured master password; two-stage intrusion (Aug dev environment, then Nov/Dec cloud storage).

</details>