COMSBI SaaS account and data compromise

Sonicmoov confirmed theft through COMSBI SaaS operations accounts, with customer and LINE profile information affected.

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Summary

  • Environment: COMSBI SaaS administration and cloud environment
  • Operational impact: Provider blocked access; SaaS service remained available
  • Financial impact: No confirmed incident cost quantified
  • Record status: Developing record. Reviewed November 14, 2026; updated as evidence emerges.

What happened

Sonicmoov confirmed an intruder used operations/support accounts to take multiple customers’ data from COMSBI SaaS during November 9–10, 2026. Cloud configuration and credentials were also accessed. [3]

Impact

  • Exposed fields varied by customer, including identity/contact information and LINE profiles. Sonicmoov excluded its separate Enterprise platform and said SaaS held no card data. [3]
  • Human Adjust reported preliminary maxima of 58,510 user records and 116,518 LINE-friend profiles; these potentially overlapping groups are not a combined person count. [1]
  • Tokyo Tatemono confirmed leakage affecting up to 490 users of its Nihonbashi-building LINE service, including contacts, registration answers and profiles. It excluded card details, passwords, addresses and birth dates. [2]

Timeline

  1. Unauthorized access begins

    Operations/support accounts were misused.

    [3]
  2. Access blocked and accounts reset

    Detection at 07:36 JST preceded containment actions completed by 09:17.

    [3]
  3. Provider discloses breach

    The provider notice describes scope and response.

    [3]
  4. Briefing updated

    This briefing was last reviewed and updated on November 14, 2026.

Threat Group & Attack Vector

Compromised internal credentials provided cross-customer administrative access. How the credentials were obtained remained under investigation. [3]

Actors

  • No threat actor group has been identified in the reviewed public evidence.

TTPs

Response

Sonicmoov blocked abusive access, reset accounts and began rotating credentials and strengthening authentication. Service remained available. [3] Downstream scope appears in the Human Adjust notice and Tokyo Tatemono notice.